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CHAPTER 4

Determinism and the Problem of
Individual Freedom in Li Zehou’s Thought
Andrew LAMBERT

Li Zeh ou ’s work can be understood as an account of a Chinese modernity, a vision for Chinese society that seeks to integrate three distinct philosophical approaches. These are Chinese history and culture, which Li understands as largely Confucian; Marxism, which has exerted such influence on a
modernizing China; and Western learning more generally, as expressed by figures such as Immanuel Kant and Sigmund Freud. Li also frequently expresses
the hope that a Chinese modernity will be one in which the importance of the
individual is recognized and rights and freedoms are upheld.1 But this stance
raises an important question: how are individuality and freedom understood in
Li’s philosophical system? In this chapter, I examine what resources Li offers to
help us conceptualize their place in a modernity with Chinese characteristics.
Confucian culture is often regarded as authoritarian and hierarchical, less interested than more liberal traditions in an ideal such as freedom. So how does freedom relate to the Confucian root of Chinese culture, as construed by Li? And
is his call for a China that respects individual freedoms a direct consequence of
his theoretical commitments, or it is a more personal stance?
Exploring the issues of individuality and freedom in Li’s work is important for another reason; it enables us to better understand Li’s philosophical
framework and how the three major influences noted above are integrated.
Specifically, questions of individuality and freedom arise at the intersection of
two great philosophical thrusts in Li’s work. These are a deterministic thrust,
derived from Marxist historical materialism, and his interest in personal free94
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dom. Examining the conceptions of individuality and freedom that Li offers
will tell us whether he can successfully navigate what appears, at least initially,
to be a troubling tension between these two thrusts.
A Tension in Li Zehou’s Work

A tension arises from Li’s reliance on a deterministic account of the relationship
between society and the individual, on the one hand, and his account of the individual as a site of innovation and a starting point for social change. The Marxist
component of Li’s theory suggests that the final explanation of why society is as
it is, and why people act as they do, resides in the technological-social base of
society. There is, however, something illiberal about this, since it implies that
people’s actions are explained not by their own choices but by larger, sometimes
unnoticed, social and economic forces. Li attempts to marry this foundation
of historical materialism with Kantian accounts of the human psychology and
cognitive structures. On the surface this approach is appealing, because it seems
to bring with it Kant’s concern with freedom—that a person’s action—or more
accurately, a person’s will—is not conditioned by external forces but is the product of that person’s own choices. But this amalgam of two influential philosophies brings its own difficulties. Specifically, it is not clear that Li has escaped
the problem of determinism that arises when all human action is traced to an
external material base. How do we know that the thoughts, feelings, and desires
that lead to action are not themselves the product of external material forces,
which we do not control?
This tension might also be stated in terms of two chains of causal influence that flow in opposite directions. The first moves from external social forces
in toward the individual, while the second flows outward from the individual,
bringing about change in the world around the individual. There is a puzzle
as to how these two elements of Li’s philosophical system fit together, as well
as the question of whether he can articulate a viable conception of human
freedom built on a deterministic foundation. What follows is an attempt to
articulate that tension and to explore possible resolutions to it suggested in Li’s
work, including the various conceptions of freedom that he considers. Can Li’s
work bequeath a novel account of freedom—a freedom consistent with Confucian values—or is his work too invested in the kind of social determinism from
which liberal reformers wish to escape? We are looking for an account of how
the individual in Li’s system can be an agent of change in his or her environment
while also being the product of that environment.
In what follows, I first outline the tension in Li’s work. I describe the social
determinism implicit in Li’s adaptations of Marxist ideas, in notions such as the
cultural-psychological formation (wenhua xinli jiegou) and sedimentation ( jid-
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ian). I then explore accounts of individuality and freedom in Li’s work, which
might provide philosophical justification for contemporary calls for personal
freedom and respect for human rights. To anticipate what then follows, I argue
that some of those accounts, particularly those that draw on Kant’s work on
rationality and the will, are problematic; but Li’s work in aesthetics does offer a
novel account of freedom and a valuable form of individuality with Confucian
characteristics. This freedom involves orienting desires and emotions toward
shared communal objects and experiences, which allows for the coordination of
desires (not merely private desire satisfaction) and the capacity to generate aesthetic goods such as beauty, delight, and a sense of ease. This freedom is something cultivated, not merely possessed as a right, and emerges from a variety of
cultivated psychological responses that are grounded in stable social structures
and human relationships.
First, however, a clarification is necessary. Li’s work is complex and multifaceted. He covers much ground, from Kant, Marx, and Heidegger to, more
recently, Michael Sandel’s work on justice.2 Some have criticized Li for glossing
too lightly over major thinkers and their ideas.3 Setting aside this reservation,
Li describes his own work as opening up new lines of inquiry and offering suggestive but speculative theories, rather than systematically developing a single
theme or idea.4 As a result, an attempt such as this to focus narrowly on particular themes or assertions in Li’s work is vulnerable to an objection—namely,
that Li offers the grounds for a response elsewhere in his vast collection of writings. This possibility cannot be ruled out, although disparate comments and
thoughts are not necessarily complete responses. More importantly, I hope that
the following discussion will serve to unpack some of Li’s valuable contributions to Chinese thought and, as Li himself hopes, encourage more discussion
of ideas broached but not fully explored in his writing.
Determinism in Li’s Work: Historical Materialism

Li offers a theory of what he calls historical ontology or anthropological ontology. This is derived from Marx’ deterministic theory of historical materialism,
which Li explicitly commends as a mode of social explanation5 but which features important differences. Li shares with Marx the conviction that most fundamental explanation of human existence is rooted in the material and social
worlds. Human life is ultimately to be understood in terms of the development
of tool use and the evolution of productive forces such as science and technology. In his On Traditional Chinese Intellectual History, Li quotes approvingly
from The German Ideology, in which Marx emphasizes how society and social
structure determine the life of the individual, as the following quote illustrates:
“Individuals find their conditions of existence predestined, and hence may have
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their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their
class, and become subsumed under it.”6 As Li’s use of this passage makes clear,
individual life is conditioned by a more fundamental social reality.7 Wanting to
understand the nature of human life, we should not start from first-person experience and subjective reflection, for these are merely the outcome of productive
forces and social practices. Instead, we must first understand the latter and how
they give rise to the kind of consciousness and patterns of thought experienced
at the personal and subjective level.
However, Li’s ideas are to be distinguished from classical Marxism in several important ways. First, Li has little interest in class as a unit of social analysis;
he focuses more on technology, social practices and their historical origins, and
the effects of both on the individual person. Also, while Li’s work retains the
notion of historical evolution, he discards the idea that society evolves through
discrete stages of history. No objective blueprint or schedule of social evolution
can be identified, and history does not progress toward a revolutionary conclusion.8 Science, technology, and productive forces do drive the evolution of
human society, but their effects are understood, not in terms of broad social categories such as discrete historical epochs, but rather in terms of the psychology
of the individual. This focus on the inner life of the individual is arguably Li’s
most important difference from Marx. Unlike Marx, who might dismiss firstperson experiences as false consciousness or for failing to reflect deeper structural realities, Li grants theoretical weight to the structure of inner experiences.
But he retains the deterministic thrust of Marx’ work: changing technology and
social conditions generate and structure an individual psychology.
Li’s use of the term “psychology” (xinli) here is very broad, including
diverse aspects of human consciousness such as concepts, emotions, and desires.
This direct link between productive forces or social practices, on the one hand,
and the mental lives of individuals on the other is captured by Li’s idea of the
cultural-psychological formation (wenhua-xinli jiegou). In Li’s words, “Human
psychology is the product of our human history.”9 The exact causal pathways
involved are, Li maintains, empirical matters rather than theoretical questions
and are difficult to specify in the absence of advances in empirical psychology.
Nevertheless, this framework for explaining human consciousness, or “psychology,” illustrates Li’s deterministic account of how society progresses.
The deterministic nature of this framework can be articulated in at least
three ways. The first is that all concepts have their origins in external social
practices. In this, Li agrees with anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s claim that
human nature is the product of history and culture.10 Even the most fundamental concepts and categories through which humans experience and make sense
of the world originate in social practices. These include concepts such as time
and causation. Li thus opposes philosophers, such as Kant, who claim a priori
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knowledge or categories of experience. Even ideas that seem to us to be commonsense, requiring no education and having no basis in any particular social
practice are found, upon correct investigation, to be the product of some social
practice (though it might be so ancient that we are no longer aware of the link
between practice and thought). There is thus no a priori structure of human
cognition or thought that is independent of social context and material forces.
The individual mind is entirety rooted in the external world.
A second feature of this system, which ties thought to external social practice, is the tendency toward cultural relativism at both the conceptual and evaluative (moral) levels. The forms of life or social practices determine the conceptual and normative frameworks through which communities and individuals
understand the world. For example, those who lived in farming communities
would understand the world in terms of those practices that constituted agricultural production. In the case of China, Li explains how a distinctively Chinese cultural-psychological formation can be traced back to Confucian culture
and to the primitive agrarian society that preceded Confucius.11 Li identifies
in that tradition two particular foundational social practices that structured
people’s worldview: clan-based hierarchical social relationships and ritual, both
of which date from prehistoric times.
Clan structures, which gave rise to stable communities and prized seniority, shaped Confucian moral ideals such as humaneness (ren),12 while ritual was
the attempt to codify early efforts to organize human use of tools to meet basic
human needs.13 But ritual also had a psychological function: participating in
ritualized practice served to implant ideas and ways of seeing the world into
the minds of participants, bringing about shared social understandings that
generated social order. People’s attention and thinking were drawn to the same
things—such as the practices that produced and sustained crops in an agricultural society; they experienced the same emotions toward those features of the
world, and those emotions were also reinforced through joyous, aesthetically
striking ritualized songs and dance;14 and they experienced a sense of unity of
harmony as a result of such social and emotional unity. Such shared norms and
understandings were then formally codified as laws and institutions. In this way,
social practices such as ritual determined subjects’ conceptual understanding,
emotional dispositions, and sense of what was rational or reasonable.
The role of social practices in structuring individual psychology and judgment can be traced down through Chinese history. Li also offers a similar historical and cultural analysis regarding how beauty evolved within the Chinese tradition and how this form of aesthetic consciousness is different from the kinds
of aesthetic appreciation that emerged in non-Chinese cultural traditions.15
This theoretical approach has several strengths. Li’s theory and the theoretical defense of relativism therein allow for the Chinese (i.e., Confucian) tra-
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dition to be treated as an independent historical and cultural tradition, not one
to be understood through Western historical models (though clearly Li borrows
from Marx to some extent). Different cultural traditions can, over time, interact
and influence each other, but they do so as equals, such that any “Western” cultural tradition might take as much from China as China takes from it. Another
strength of Li’s framework derives from the weight it grants to history and
existing tradition in explaining both society and the life of the individual. The
socially grounded holistic nature of this theory provides a plausible rationalization of Confucian values, in which history and tradition are so prominent. Li’s
historical ontology enables him to defend the Confucian tradition, making the
values and claims that define that it appear broadly reflective of truths about
underlying reality.
However, the relativism of this framework also creates difficulty for understanding how freedom and individuality fit into it. Given its implicit conceptual
and moral relativism, the question arises of whether individuals can conceive of
the world in ways independent of the historically rooted practices under whose
influence they live. Similarly, the framework suggests that the subject’s normative judgments—what the subject considers reasonable, good, right, beautiful,
and so forth—are conditioned by the social environment in which they live.
Such a stance does not deny the possibility of critical reflection, but it does suggest that it arises only within a framework rooted in a preexisting social reality.
Further, the importance of unity and shared socially responsive emotions raises
questions about the relative importance of dissent, resistance, and individuality.
A third deterministic force in Li’s work is his account of human nature as,
in part, a biologically grounded human nature. Certain biological needs or dispositions are common to all members of the species and are reflected in certain
social practices. The clearest example of this is Li’s account of filial conduct
(xiao). The importance of this value in Confucian thought stems partly from
the fact that it reflects a generic human nature—the affective bond between
parent and child. Parents feel love toward offspring, while children feel respect
and fear toward parents.16 The biological reality of this bond is, Li argues,
expressed in Analects 17.21.17 Therein, Zaiwo questions the need for three years
of mourning for parents; Confucius answers that cultivated persons find “no
relish” in “fine food,” “no pleasure” in “music,” and “no comfort” in “lodgings.”
For Li, this line is evidence of a deep psychological bond between child and parent that is rooted in biology.
Presenting Confucianism as a form of naturalism, in which generic features
of humanity shape the conceptions of ethics that governs human life, is plausible and has a textual basis. However, it raises questions for other parts of Li’s
grander philosophical system. Specifically, it raises questions about how such
biological forces fit with the cultural and social practices described above, and
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the role that each plays in determining individual psychology. Which aspects
of that psychology are due to social factors and which are biological? Perhaps
this question can be left open as an empirical issue awaiting investigation. What
matters is that this form of explanation adds another deterministic element to
Li’s theory.
We should note, however, that Li himself also claims biology as a source of
individuality and uniqueness.18 He insists that the particular biologically determined differences that arise between people (presumably, differences such as
height and even temperament) can never be adequately captured by theory and
must be accepted as a form of individuality. To what extent biologically determined differences between people are more significant than biologically determined similarities is a substantial debate that cannot be settled here. Suffice it to
say that, given how appeals to biology in settling the question of human nature
are inherently deterministic, there is scope for questioning whether Li’s appeal
to biology further reduces the scope for a theory of undetermined, free human
action. Since this is an open question, I will set aside the question of biological
determinism in what follows.
Let us summarize the deterministic strand of Li’s thought. Li’s theory provides an explanation of how various forces condition individual psychology
without themselves being subject to the endorsement of the individual. Following Marx, material forces and technology determine the social practices that
constitute society, and these in turn determine the inner lives of people in those
societies, including both the conceptual schemes through which they order
experience, their emotional responses, and their conceptions of rationality and
the reasonable. Further, such processes are understood as arising within specific
historical and cultural traditions, and Li’s work mainly focuses on the form
such forces have taken within Chinese history. This is captured in the muchdiscussed slogan “xiti zhongyong” (“a Western root with Chinese application”
西体中用):19 a broadly Marxist ontology is applied to Chinese history. This
means that Chinese social practices and accompanying psychology have been
influenced by a civilization rooted in hierarchical clan and kinship relations and
ritual practices. It was from this root in agricultural communities that Confucian thought emerged and sought to refine and respond to such circumstances.
So what room does this account leave for individuality, such that a modern
China can be the product of the cultural forces that created it, yet also grant
greater recognition to individual persons as they emerge against such a background of culturally determined norms, thoughts, and feelings?
Unlike classical Marxism, this account has no transcendental historical
narrative or God’s-eye perspective that the intellect can draw upon to ascertain
the fundamental laws of history—knowledge of which would constitute freedom from the confusion of everyday social life. The direction of social trends
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and thus individual psychology cannot be charted in advance. If rational
judgments and emotional responses are conditioned by our social lives, then
the conceptual space for individual choice, unconditioned by social forces,
diminishes.
This suits the Confucian tradition and the idea that all selves are social
selves, but it creates challenges for ideals such as freedom and self-determination.
For example, in a society in which being a filial son, receptive to parental need
and opinion, is highly valued, it becomes harder to explain and positively value
a person who does not behave in such a way but, rather, seeks to live a more
independent life. As Li often discusses, the Confucian tradition frequently promotes the ideal of a thoroughgoing unity, perhaps best expressed in the idea of
tianren heyi (unity of the cosmos and humanity). As the Liushi Chunqiu states,
“Unity brings peace, and differences bring danger.”20 Given such an emphasis
on unity, what prospects are there for a Chinese modernity that is molded by
earlier social practices but can accommodate greater emphasis on individuality,
without abandoning that past?
This is not to claim that Li’s work lacks any responses to this question;
rather, the deterministic forces contained within Li’s own theoretical framework present challenges to any account of how the direction of causation and
influence flow the other way—from the individual out into the social world.
Li hopes to provide such an account by drawing European Enlightenment
thought, specifically, on Kant’s notion of the rational and autonomous subject.
But how does this work, and is Li successful?
Li on the Power of the Individual to Initiate Social Change

To understand the reverse process—that of the individual subject controlling
and reordering the social world—it is useful to understand the point at which
human action arises in Li’s system, at least from the subject’s point of view. As
noted above, the inner life of the subject, xinli (often translated as “psychology”), is one element in Li’s cultural-psychological formation. Although I will
use the term “psychology” here for the sake of consistency, it should be noted
that xinli is broader in meaning that the English term suggests. Xinli refers to
the point at which a person or subject encounters or experiences the world, and
it includes all the reactions, feelings, motivations, and thoughts that a person
has when confronting events in the world. Given this psychology, the human
subject as active agent is captured by Li’s term zhutixing.21 This word is usually translated as “subjectivity” or “subjectality” (to underline the difference
between it and passive notions of subjectivity). Li writes that zhutixing refers
to a human person who has “the capacity of an active entity” and who has “an
active capability in relation to its environment.”22
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In articulating this active quality of the human subject, Li follows Kant’s
division of the human subject into the three realms of the intellect (cognition),
the aesthetic, and the moral. Li emphasizes that the origin of the active quality
lies within that part of the psychological formation that constitutes the moral
realm, and the moral will in particular. In his “Fourth Outline of Human Subjectivity,” Li writes that “morality is prior to cognition.”23 Thus, despite the critical stance taken in his earlier work on Kant,24 Li in later work is drawn back to
Kant’s account of the moral realm as a realm of freedom.
In his Outline of My Philosophy (Zhexue gangyao),25 Li comes to view
the categorical imperative, and the capacity to abide by it, as the ability that
distinguishes humans qua humans (in contrast to animals, which lack this
form of rationality). Li, pace Kant, still holds that all ideas and norms have
their origin in social practice and experience; but he accepts that certain ideas
or principles (including the categorical imperative) are so central to how a
person thinks that they appear to be a priori or innate. Thus, although Kant
was mistaken about the origins of the categorical imperative—claiming it to
be the product of pure practical reason—he was correct in ascribing to it the
highest possible moral worth. That is because the categorical imperative indicates a will, a morally good will, which is conditioned in a special and law-like
way. At its simplest, the will is a conscious striving to bring about the ends
that an agent seeks to realize. But such willing is vulnerable to the vagaries of
desire and the emotions and is thus not free. Only a will that is structured by
a commitment solely to those ends that could reasonably be endorsed by any
rational agent is a truly good will. And in making one’s will conform to such
universal law-like regularity, the subject attains freedom—from the deterministic empirical world and from the capricious influences of the body and
human desire.
The capacity to set one’s will in such a way that it cannot be swayed by
empirical concerns is also a source of personal worth. Willful fortitude in the
face of both the world and one’s narrower self-interest bestows the highest
worth on human life. If humans are capable, as rational individuals, of obeying the categorical imperative, then they are worthy of respect qua individuals.
Understanding the inner life of the human subject in this way would thus provide a theoretical justification for greater recognition of individual rights and
individual freedoms in contemporary Chinese society.
Appealing to Kant to develop an account of freedom consistent with
the features of the Chinese Confucian tradition stressed by Li faces difficulties, however. Specifically, its relation to other elements of Li’s theory is puzzling.26 Furthermore, I believe that Li’s work contains other more interesting
ideas, which could be developed into an account of freedom without relying on
a Kantian framework.
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Problems with the Kantian Notion of Freedom

Various problems accompany this attempted merger of Kantian and Marxist
thought; here I consider three. First, it is possible to question Li’s appeal to
Kant’s categorical imperative by directly questioning the value of appealing to
the categorical imperative as the ground of freedom and individual dignity—
that is, by questioning the assumptions made in Kant’s moral philosophy. The
most direct challenge is to ask why binding oneself to a law, allowing oneself to
be constrained by it, should be understood as a form of freedom. Kant’s answer
was that this law-like structuring of the will was a form of pure practical reason,
a higher former of rationality than instrumental reasoning. It insulated subjects
from the deterministic forces of the empirical world and allowed the agents to
be author of their own laws. But this idea requires belief in this special form of
rationality, which many philosophers have rejected. Setting aside this question,
there is the simpler objection that the categorical imperative presents a counterintuitive account of freedom. Rather than consisting of being bound to a law,
freedom is often understood as liberating oneself from compulsion and rejecting laws or rules. Arguably, this is a more intuitively plausible and compelling
notion of freedom.
Furthermore, there is the objection that the categorical imperative amounts
to an empty formalism—it permits too much and thus cannot serve to ensure
that personal freedom is protected. Its lack of specificity means that it could be
used to justify or permit policies or actions that threaten personal freedoms,
since it is unclear whether the policies or actions are “universalizable” or not. As
Li himself notes, Kant regarded this ethical commitment as being compatible
with the restriction of voting rights to property owners.27 Hence, abstract moral
principles alone, despite the well-meant supervisory role of rational reflection,
do not guarantee the safeguarding of individual rights and freedoms that Li
calls for. Rather than pursue such objections to Kant’s moral theory, however, I
will focus instead on its relation to Li’s philosophical system.
Problems Integrating the Categorical Imperative into
Li’s Theoretical Framework

The first issue to be considered regarding integration of the categorical imperative into Li’s theoretical framework is how the categorical imperative can be a
foundational principle, given that Li rejects Kant’s category of the a priori in
human cognition. More specifically, given that such a form of rationality is not
crucial to the Confucian tradition—a tradition in which, according to Li, pragmatic reasoning (shiyong lixing) dominates—then how could it come to hold
a dominant place in the psychological formation of a subject immersed in that
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tradition?28 It might be a worthy moral ideal, one that all people should adopt,
but this does answer the question of how it comes to have authority with the
particular cultural-psychological formation that develops within the Confucian
tradition.
In fact, Li has an answer to this question, at least in theory. One of the
appealing features of Li’s system is that the cultural-psychological formation
of a group or tradition is unbounded—it is open to all influences, as long as
these can be integrated into existing social practices and categories of understanding. Over time and through interaction with other cultures, globalized
psychological formations could emerge. The Chinese tradition—as one set
of social practices, along with concepts and feelings that make up individual
psychology—could absorb other initially alien influences, including the idea
of the categorical imperative. In a global marketplace of concepts and ways of
thinking and feeling, the categorical imperative could emerge as the acme of
reason, something to which subjects feel a strong commitment.
Li seems to present the categorical imperative in this way, as a universal
ideal toward which all people or cultures will evolve. This is a possibility. However, for at least two reasons we can ask whether it should be treated as such a
foundational, authoritative norm.
First, the appeal of Li’s original account was its implicit call for greater
recognition of different cultural traditions, each of which might prioritize different moral principles or norms. Importing the categorical imperative into an
account of Chinese modernity and freedom threatens to undermine this feature
of Li’s work. This is particularly relevant in the case of China because, and here
lies the second reservation, the Confucian tradition emphasizes commitment
to personal attachments and family. Such commitments to nearest and dearest can conflict with commitments to the kind of impartiality represented by
the categorical imperative, and such that it is not clear which should take priority.29 Thus, whether or not the categorical imperative will become a global
foundational moral principle seems, according to Li’s own theory of culturalpsychological formation, to be an open question, one answered only by seeing
how social and historical practices do, in fact, evolve.
The Categorical Imperative Obscures Other Elements of Li’s Thought
Relevant to Freedom

A further reason to resist the temptation to appeal to Kantian moral theory in
the context of a Chinese modernity is that it obscures other important aspects
of Li’s work, which can themselves form the basis of novel conceptions of freedom and individuality. The rich psychological picture of the human subject
developed by Li, particularly in his work on aesthetics, differs from the more
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restrictive psychology of action involved in upholding the categorical imperative. For instance, Kant famously does not grant any moral authority to feelings in the determination of action. But in Li’s psychology, feelings are reliable
because they partly derive from and reflect social and historical order. Indeed,
Li explicitly disagrees with Kant here: “I think he [Kant] places too great an
emphasis on the rational faculties. Many other psychological functions participate in the free play [of ideas]; these include the emotions, sensations, desires,
and the unconscious.”30 Here Li is talking about Kant’s conception of aesthetics,
but the comment also applies to the contrast between the two accounts of how
human action ideally arises. The Kantian view treats rational action as having
a specific form. It is acting according to principle, which involves the willful
“overruling” of potentially disruptive impulses. This kind of willful self-control
is the grounds of freedom and self-respect. In contrast, Li’s “psychology” of
rational action is more nebulous, recognizing that a broader array of forces can
be the source of reasonable conduct. Li’s psychology suggests a sensibility in
which action arises from various mental events; these include emotions and
intuitions that are not clearly connected to a principle or any systematic conception of action or desired ends. Such actions might merely seem, intuitively,
to be appropriate.
In addition to the recognition of different sources of rationality, there is
also an issue of rational sensitivity. Emphasizing the conditioning of the will
according to a specific principle diminishes sensitivity to the many factors considered irrelevant to that principle. But the psychological subject in Li’s work is
responsive to a much wider set of influences, since his or her sensitivity is not
the product of a single principle and can treat such influences as reasonable or
rational. This can be thought of as an aesthetic sensibility, which grants motivational force to emotion, intuition, and even unconscious influences. In fact, it is
Li’s work in aesthetics that furnishes his most interesting conception of freedom
and individuality, one that is consistent with many of the features of the Confucian tradition that Li describes. Before turning to that account, we should
note another major development in Li’s work that sits uneasily with attempts to
elevate Kantian moral theory to a global ideal.
In following Kant, Li has unwittingly accepted a host of cultural assumptions that are implicit in Kant’s narrow focus on the will but do not fit the cultural assumptions ascribed to the Confucian tradition. Kant was a puritanical
moralist and, as Bertrand Russell notes, Puritanism has produced a morality that
places great emphasis on the will—that is, free and knowing personal choice.31
But a Puritan morality of personal conduct might be of limited relevance to
a tradition infused with Confucian values, which lacks any developed notion
of will in the Kantian sense.32 Furthermore, Li has good reason to be wary of
any conception of action that conveys religious ideas, such as Puritanism. This
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wariness derives from his claim that the Chinese tradition be understood as a
“culture grounded in pleasant feeling” (legan wenhua 乐感文化), sometimes
translated as a “culture of optimism.”
The basic premise of legan wenhua is that the Chinese tradition features a
“one world” view.33 There is only one realm from which ultimate human meaning can be derived, and it is the historical and social human world. No higher
transcendental realm exists to guide conduct. This is confirmed in the ideal of a
unity of the cosmic and the human (tianren heyi).34 The Chinese tradition thus
contrasts with traditions that derive their ethical and social codes from a creator
God. However, the will as the source of human action is important in the Puritanical moral tradition because it is the instrument through which the subject
can make himself or herself worthy of entering a divine realm, a second world.
It is redolent with self-denial and a flawed human nature (responsible intrusive
passions), which is overcome by an appropriately conditioned will. Insofar as Li
strongly opposes any suggestion of a transcendent world in the Chinese tradition, he is compelled to reject any construal of a human will derived from such
metaphysical assumptions; and Kant’s work emerges from just such a religious
orientation.
In addition to making us wary of any account of freedom too firmly
grounded in the notion of a moral will, Li’s notion of a culture grounded in
pleasant feelings (legan wenhua) also serves as the starting point for a different
conception of freedom and individuality. This is one grounded in pleasure and
the aesthetic sensibility. Li’s idea of legan wenhua offers a different picture of
the origins of worthwhile human action. Life is short and its hazards many, and
such insecure conditions lead to an existential drive to make the most of life
in this world, without recourse to a higher realm. Under such conditions, the
highest human end is the ability to realize pleasure despite the circumstances;
and in the Confucian tradition, such pleasure is primarily realized in the pursuit of the everyday social life and in particular through interpersonal relationships.35 This idea, combined with Li’s nuanced and realistic picture of psychology and rational action, can be used to develop an aesthetic notion of individual
freedom that is consistent with Li’s account of the Confucian tradition.
Freedom and Individuality in an Aesthetic Tradition

In developing his aesthetics, Li again follows Kant, accepting his threefold division of the realms of human experience into intellectual, moral, and aesthetic.
While the kind of freedom developed via the categorical imperative resides in
the intellectual or rational realm, it is possible to approach freedom through an
account of the self as an aesthetic sensibility. The power to reorder and remake
the world (freedom) resides not solely in intellectual capacity and conscious
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willful striving but also in cultivated and reliable aesthetic responses, allied with
practical skill and imagination. Li explains the notion of aesthetics in this way:
“Aesthetics is the sedimentation of social entities (concepts, ideals, attitudes,
and meanings) onto psychological functions, particularly the emotions and
sensory cognition.”36
On this account, freedom consists in a kind of attunement to the social
world in which the subjects are immersed, which enhances their capacity for
action. An already-existing external social reality permeates and molds inner
emotions or, to use Li’s term, humanizes inner nature (ziran de renhua).37 The
freedom that this process, when coupled with the relevant practical training
and skills, enhances is the capacity to contribute to the lives of those with whom
one shares everyday life—that is, to lead them to aesthetic experiences broadly
categorized as pleasant (le). This conception of freedom has strong affinities
with a Confucian culture rooted in personal ties and pleasant feeling (legan
wenhua). It is the logical consequence of a worldview lacking a transcendental
realm of value, and it expresses traditional Confucian ideals such as delight or
pleasure (le 乐), homeliness or repose (an 安), and ease ( yi 逸), which are much
discussed in Chinese aesthetics.38
This account of freedom emerges from Li’s account of the cultural-
psychological formation, which includes an aesthetic psychological formation.39
The human subject becomes increasingly sensitive to aesthetic experiences in
two ways: through the increasingly aesthetic quality of the environment as it is
shaped by human activity, and through individual education in, among other
things, music and poetry, both of which cultivate an aesthetic sensibility.40 The
result is an inner nature—thoughts, sensibility, dispositions, and motivations—
that gradually harmonizes with external circumstances and social practices.
The subjects becomes better able to respond to their environment and produce
actions that, in their social milieu, bring about shared delight or, as Li also calls
it, beauty. Aesthetic sensibility can serve as the basis for practical action in the
social world because “musical harmony is similar in structure to the harmony
of human relationships,” an idea rooted in the Xunzi and the Zuozhuan.41 The
idea is that actions, like music, that powerfully convey sensuous experiences can
influence human emotions and desires and thus can direct action and remove
conflict.
This conception of freedom as the developing of an aesthetic sensibility,
and a practical ability grounded in that sensibility, can be sketched further by
examining Li’s gloss on Analects 8.8, which reads: “Be awakened by poetry, be
established by ritual, be perfected in music.”42 According to Li, this passage represents a developmental pathway to an enhanced level of agency or influence in
the world. Let us consider each part of this three-part development account of
character in turn, for each conveys an important aspect of aesthetic freedom.

Ames - Li Zehou.indb 107

12/28/2017 5:26:31 PM

108

Li Zehou and the Modernization of Confucianism

The phrase “Be awakened by poetry” echoes Confucius’ exhortation to his
followers to read the Classic of Songs to develop a richer vocabulary (Analects
17.9). For Li, however, “Be awakened by poetry” is a reference not merely to
poetry or sung verse but to all literary forms. Reminiscent of a plea for a humanities-style education, it is a call to be well read and familiar with all sources of
basic knowledge about the world—politics, history, and so forth. Li describes
such learning as “establishing the structure of the intellect,” or the “internalization of rationality.”43 The goal is to acquire a more sophisticated conceptual
grasp of the details and subtleties of the surrounding world, within which the
subject must live and act.
There are two ways in which such learning contributes to an aesthetic conception of freedom. First, the literature and ideas that a subject acquires are
those of a shared tradition, and this shared cultural understanding facilitates
practical interactions. Any person embedded in the Confucian tradition will
see the world through the common ideas of the classical texts and history, which
have shaped the present. Furthermore, these ideas and concepts are not “cold”
and inertly factual; they include a “warm” affective and motivating element.
For example, heroic figures arouse emotions among all persons who are aware
of their deeds. Ideally, a learned person can appeal to and utilize these shared
images and motifs in directing the conduct of others, on account of this shared
emotional resonance among members of that tradition.44 One example is how
shared motifs in Confucian poetry consistently arouse certain emotions in the
reader, as in a person who consistently feels sadness at witnessing the suffering
of others. Li’s quote from Sui and Tang dynasties scholar Kong Yingda is apt
here: “What one expresses in a poem is but one’s own personal heart; yet this
‘personal’ heart is actually the heart of the whole people.”45 Scholarly learning
thus comes to have a practical impact on society.
The second phrase in Analects 8.8, “be established by ritual,” expresses a
further aspect of aestheticized freedom, one in which practical accomplishments are central. Within Li’s philosophical framework, the rites refer to the
social practices that create and sustain a social or geographical community.
Ritual is important for three reasons. First, “ritual” refers to the passive training
of character and to the internalization of communal regulations.46 This might
include forming the habit of daily greetings for parents. Habitually complying
with norms enables subjects to function within the social practices that constitute their social world.
The second reason is that the Confucian emphasis on ritual also involves
an active component, in that a social philosophy based on ritual idealizes practical mastery. The human subject must act in various social settings and so must
learn to manipulate the relevant physical objects appropriately; this requires an
understanding of how they work and the laws that govern them. Unlike mere
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ceremony, the relevant kind of rituals here requires application and practice
to master—such as the six Confucian arts, which include charioteering and
archery. While such practical learning and knowledge of governing laws is initially directed to objects treated in a ritual context, this basic mode of learning
applies to practical conduct in general. It produces people who are able to work
with and make use of objective laws of nature—in a manner that is described
in Xunzi’s naturalistic account of tian (the cosmos or heavens).47 People must
understand the laws that govern the behavior of objects that they use. A subject
with such practical and theoretical know-how can, for example, plant and harvest crops successfully, as well as skillfully maintain good relations with others.
Ritual is thus a means to being practically effective in the world in general.
A third function of ritual in the classical Confucian account is the molding of a specific set of biologically grounded emotional responses. The emotional lives of humans can be ordered, and their emotional connections with
others adjusted, through ritual practice. For Li, humans and animals share certain primitive desires and emotions—as Analects 2.7 notes, for example, dogs,
horses, and humans all naturally have feelings for their parents. But what distinguishes the humans is the capacity to cultivate and refine such feelings. This is
the purpose of ritual, and such refined feelings are constitutive of the Confucian ideal of humaneness (ren).
For example, Li understands xiao 孝 (filial conduct) as an emotional sensibility, and ritual should refine the natural love of child for parents into the emotions of filial conduct, which he characterizes as respect and fear.48 Ritual thus
cultivates the emotions integral to family life, enabling individuals to flourish
therein. But the task of cultivating the emotions continues beyond the family. In
order to become “humane” (ren), this emotional engagement must develop into
a compassion for others that extends as far as the clan network extends. The key
idea here, also captured by Li’s phrase “humanization of nature,” is that ritual
serves to cultivate the emotional life of the subject. After all, individuals can fail
to develop their emotional responses, remaining in tension with or baffled by
the practices and emotions in their surrounding social world.
The third phrase of Analects 8.8, “be perfected in music,” indicates the
final element of a freedom that is rooted in the aesthetic realm: music. Li notes,
“If the self-cultivation of the gentleman does not include the study of rites and
music, it is impossible for him to become a complete person [cheng 诚].”49 How
does music contribute to an account of freedom?
The simplest answer is that it cultivates an emotional responsiveness—
one who is exposed to and appreciates music has a fuller range of emotional
responses.50 Furthermore, the coordination and attunement that musical mastery involves—appreciating which notes, rhythms, and melodies fit together;
coordinating between music, voices, and instruments—is functionally similar

Ames - Li Zehou.indb 109

12/28/2017 5:26:31 PM

110

Li Zehou and the Modernization of Confucianism

to the workings of the emotional realm. Someone who appreciates musical harmony will also appreciate how emotions relate to and transition into each other
and can find harmony among them. Consequently, the inner life of the “complete person” is characterized by heightened or more intense emotions, especially delight.51 The figure of Confucius illustrates this ideal, saying of himself,
“This is the kind of man he is—so enthusiastic he forgets to eat, so joyful he
forgets his sorrow, and totally unaware that old age is coming” (Analects 7.18).
This education in affective coordination and complementarity, cultivated
through musical training, translates to the human social world, where the same
challenges of coordination and finding appropriate arrangements arise. Affective states cultivated by music become the foundation of thought and action.
That is, the complete person’s practical responses to the world arise from emotional sensibilities and yet are reliable, or “on the mark.” This is partly because
the emotional realm, although a higher realm of human experience, is not
separated from the intellectual and practical dimensions of human cultivation
but builds on the achievements of these other two realms. Li writes, “The aesthetic is purely sensuous but at the same time comprehends a history of rational
sedimentation; it is natural but at the same time incorporates the accumulated
achievements of society.”52 Cultivated persons in some sense embody the forces
that Li identifies as driving social progress in general. Their rational sensibility
reflects the sedimentation of traditional knowledge and social practices; they
have achieved practical mastery, and their emotional reactions are structured
by those social practices, enabling them to find beauty therein. This highest
state of cultivation is what Confucius was referring to in Analects 2.4 when he
declared that, at age seventy, he was able to “follow the desires of the heart without overstepping the bounds of right.”
This achieved state, as Li notes, is a form of freedom.53 The emotions are
unforced and spontaneous and yet have been successfully socialized so that they
harmonize with practical and social norms. Further, someone with this degree
of refinement can sense the mood of others, can identify practical needs, and
has the skills and training needed to transform the mood or emotions of those
with whom he or she interacts. The emotional impact of such practical skills
is analogous to the effects of poets on their audience, although the latter work
solely with words and not actions.
This capacity to transform social interactions is one part of legan wenhua,
a culture grounded in pleasant feeling. Further, in the Confucian tradition,
this capacity is often understood to function in a specific context: kinship and
human relationships. Li writes that “life’s significance emerges only in the context of interpersonal relationships within real-world society”54 and that what
mattered most in Confucius’ intellectual milieu were “considerations of timebound interpersonal relationships and human emotion.”55 It is against such an
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understanding of the most fundamental aims and purposes of human life—the
creation of shared delight within networks of human attachment—that the
value of such freedom becomes clear.
Summarizing the Aesthetic Conception of Freedom

Li’s account of aesthetic cultivation and his interpretation of Analects 8.8 shows
that there is a robust notion of individual freedom in Confucian thought, one
that can inform how individual worth and dignity are understood in a Chinese
modernity. It treats the diverse practical motivations of the human subject’s
psychological formation (xinli jiegou)—including emotions and intuitions—
as reliable and on an equal footing with narrower conceptions of rationality,
such as self-consciously acting according to a principle. The rationality resides
in the cultivated sensibility of the agent and the effectiveness in realizing aesthetic ends of beauty, ease, delight, and so forth. In his work, Li consistently
stresses the role of the unconscious (wuyishi 无疑是) in determining action.56
However, “unconscious” here often refers to the fact that reasonable action can
suggest itself to the subject, producing beneficial social results, without the subject understanding why that course of action presented itself when or as it did.
This sense of the unconscious thus refers simply to what is not directly available
to consciousness or what cannot be articulated.57 The lack of detailed justification for action does not imply a lack of freedom. Subjects must first understand
the tradition—the many rituals and social practices that constitute it—from
which their psychology emerges, while conditioning their psychology in the
manner indicated by Analects 8.8; only then are their psychological responses
trustworthy. But at the same time, because the lives of all members of a tradition are conditioned by the same technologies and social forces, the emotional
responses of a properly trained subject can resonate with others. Such emotional
responses are thus not capricious, irrational, or challenging to an otherwise free
and rational subject, who must willfully resist them; their grounding in shared
social practices bestows on them a veridical quality.
Furthermore, when the Confucian tradition is understood as a culture in
which this-worldly aesthetic goods such as pleasure are a primary aim, realized
through networks of clan or human relationships, then understanding and creating what brings pleasure to others who share a social world is of utmost value.
This involves the increasingly effortless capacity to put others and oneself at
ease, guided by a rich array of psychological prompts—intuitions, emotions,
practical knowledge. The ability to realize such a higher quality of interaction
in everyday social life, particularly as shared pleasure, thus becomes an important conception of freedom.
Arguably, such pleasures are not simply hedonistic and transient feelings
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of pleasure but are feelings that emerge as a result of deeper forms of accord and
successful interaction between people. This is powerfully expressed in Mencius
4A27, which seems to suggest that the fruit of humaneness, the most powerful
manifestation of it, is a musical expression of pleasure or delight that arises when
human relationships are successful: “The most authentic expression of humaneness [ren] is serving one’s parents; the most authentic expression of rightness is
following one’s elder brother. . . . When they come to the point where they cannot be stopped, then, without realizing it, one’s feet begin to step in time and
one’s hands begin to dance.”58
Evaluating Li’s Account of Aesthetic Freedom and Its Place in
a Chinese Modernity

Conceptualizing freedom in the aesthetic realm, while incorporating the definitive characteristics of the Confucian tradition, produces a nuanced account of
freedom. This freedom is not understood as the mere absence of constraint
or as crude desire-satisfaction. Rather, freedom becomes a capacity that is
acquired only through effort and cultivation. A strength of this account is
that aspects of Confucian social philosophy that initially appear conservative
and constraining—the demandingness of, and need for attention to, personal
attachments and roles—are recast as necessary ingredients of a more meaningful freedom. This account also suggests that a person might be most free when
actions have a specific and limited focus—the local social world and the human
relationships. It is here that a person’s actions have the most tangible effect and
are most “meaningful”—as the emotional impact that accompanies the creation
of memorable and moving shared social events.
How does this conception of freedom compare with others? Clearly, it is
a positive notion, requiring that a subject receive support to develop positive
capacities. It thus contrasts with accounts of negative freedom that focus solely
on noninterference. Li’s account suggests that a freedom that prizes noninterference is an empty freedom because it ignores substantive questions of what
human nature is, how this arises through interaction with technology and social
practices, and how this limits what a person can find satisfying. An individual’s
thought can fail to track such a nature, and dissonance can arise between what a
subject thinks will bring happiness and what, in fact, does. Libertarian ideals of
freedom as isolation or independence are thus opposed at the level of metaphysics and foundational accounts of the self.
A similar objection arises to the classic picture of freedom as being able to
act on one’s desires. When freedom is understood in such terms, it ignores the
origins of those desires and whether a person is really free in acting on them.
The account of freedom derived from Li’s aesthetics suggests, for example, that
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cruder, biologically rooted desires might be modified, transformed into socially
responsive desires that are structured around stable external social practices and
human relationships. Failure to cultivate one’s sensibility, acting instead from
biological desires, is a failure to attain greater freedom. Since cultivated desires
lead to greater shared pleasure and to the personal satisfaction in being able
to direct and contribute socially, they are “higher” desires, indicative of greater
freedom. Also, this alternative freedom brings with it a stronger sense of duty
than is recognized on the classical liberal account. On the aesthetic view, freedom involves a commitment to social interaction and exchange, for this is the
arena in which the aesthetic goods of beauty, ease, and pleasure are realized.
This sense of obligation is not necessarily oppressive, however, but is an essential condition of realizing these shared affective goods.
In the context of a modernity with Chinese characteristics, how does this
notion of freedom fit with the contemporary calls for individual freedom and
rights in China? It is not possible to address this question fully here, but take the
example of freedom of speech. In the liberal democratic tradition, freedom of
speech is sometimes understood as having the right to say whatever one wants.
Clearly, the free exchange of ideas brings many benefits, such as the promotion of technological and economic progress. At the same time, even within
liberal traditions the ideal of free speech is qualified, from the simple cases of
prohibiting the shouting of fire in theatres to the more nuanced questions of
whether hate speech should be permitted. Arguably, this aestheticized notion
of freedom can contribute to the debate about the limits to free speech—and
the kinds of goods it might conflict with. An approach that begins from the
capacity to create ease and pleasure in everyday social networks suggests that
speech should be treated as a social tool used to positively affect people’s aesthetic and emotional lives. The use of speech to bring about ease and delight
thus imposes restrictions on how speech can be used, since it could bring about
the opposite effects—increasing anxiety, animosity, and so forth.
Unrestrained speech undoubtedly has many advantages, but focusing on
the aesthetic realm of human experience reminds us that it is not the only human
good, and there are times when a variety of human goods are available that cannot all be realized at the same time. Perhaps the sense of ease, homeliness, and a
life imbued with a sense of le—pleasurable delight—can sometimes be a good to
rival the ideal of unrestrained speech. Any claims in this area must be made with
caution, but an honest and speculative extrapolation of the Confucian tradition
into the present and future is exactly what Li Zehou has striven to promote.
There are drawbacks to thinking of freedom as the skilled ability to generate and enjoy pleasure in networks of human relationships. Most obviously,
focusing on the aesthetic realm and the subject’s immediate social world does
not address broader political questions. For example, people could expend their
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energies on family and friends while living in an unjust social system and never
directly confronting questions of political organization and human rights. The
aesthetic in Chinese culture has sometimes been a refuge for writers who were
prevented from addressing more substantive political questions of social organization. Li himself is mindful of this, citing it as a possible reason for the “aesthetics fever” that gripped China in the 1980s.59 However, against this concern,
it seems entirely reasonable to claim that what most concerns people is often
not abstract questions of rights and political systems but how their own lives—
understood as local, limited affairs that are largely constituted by personal
attachment and social interaction—can go as well as possible. And if this is the
most basic existential question, as Li suggests, then the aesthetic conception of
freedom is, after all, worthy of further exploration.
I have argued that Li Zehou’s work on aesthetics offers a valuable notion of
freedom, one in which the individual emerges from material and social forces
but is not fully determined by them. This is not a freedom construed intellectually, something rooted in clarity of reason and the form and strength of the
moral will. Rather, it is a freedom that emerges through education and gradual
mastery of the concrete social practices that constitute the everyday life and
interactions of the subject. The fruit of such training and enhanced sensibility
is the capacity to create and share aesthetic goods. This is only one conception
of freedom, and its importance must be assessed by placing it alongside other
accounts of freedom, especially political freedoms about which this account has
little to say. The scope of action for this freedom will be more limited than more
individualistic notions of freedom as desire-satisfaction, but it is less prone to
conflict and more easily made to serve a common good. The account is worthy
of further investigation because of its innovative integration of aesthetic life and
freedom and because of strong affinities with the Confucian tradition—a tradition that any viable vision of a Chinese modernity must address.
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